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this policy has only short-term effects on immigration: migratory flows are discouraged 
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  One of the main challenges faced by an increasingly globalised world is that of 
assimilating migratory movements from the most underprivileged areas of the planet to 
those with better economic prospects. A clear example of these movements is the 
migration to the EU countries from North Africa and Eastern Europe. The main 
problem is the impossibility of completely controlling these migratory flows. 
Governments may consider different ways of restricting the entry of foreigners, the 
most evident one being to set maximum entry quotas, nevertheless, practical experience 
has shown that after these quotas have been reached, economic inequalities still drive 
the natives of developing countries to enter developed countries and remain there 
illegally. For instance, Coppel et al., 2001, calculate that 500,000 illegal immigrants 
arrive in EU countries every year.  
  An immediate consequence of illegal immigration is the growth of the 
underground economy which, in the European Union is around 12% of GDP, according 
to estimates by Schneider (2001). Illegal immigrants provide an abundant and 
inexpensive labour force that is utilised by the hidden economy, offering sub-standard 
working conditions (usually in conditions of exploitation) and with no payment of taxes. 
In particular, these wages are below market levels, and provide significant income to 
unscrupulous employers, thus spurring the appearance of illegal factories as networks 
for capturing and trafficking with illegal immigrants. 
  Within this framework, the aim of this paper is to analyse the effects of 
immigration quotas on both phenomena: illegal immigration and the underground 
economy. There is abundant literature on both these subjects, however, to our 
knowledge the clear relationship between these phenomena has received no attention in 
the literature.  
To this aim we developed a simple model in which foreign workers were 
uncertain about whether their status would be legal of illegal after arrival at their 
destination. The only information on this point is the quota laid down by the particular 
government in question. This determines the probability of becoming either a legal or 
illegal worker. On this point our model differs from most others in the literature on 
2 illegal immigration, where the condition of illegal immigrant is either established a 
priori, with no element of uncertainty (Djajic, 1997; Gaytán-Fregoso and Lahiri, 2000; 
Hazari and Sgro, 2003) or it is determined by the worker’s qualification (Kondoh, 
2000). Thus, immigration quotas act as an indicator of the possible status of potential 
immigrants. However, governments cannot completely prevent the entry of workers (on 
this point our specification differs from Carter, 1999, who considers that governments 
can impede illegal immigration). Once the immigration quota has been met, any further 
immigrants entering become illegal. The possibility of exploiting these illegal workers 
leads to native residents of the host country starting up underground economic 
activities. 
Our main conclusion is that the effect of quotas on migration rates is only 
transitory and vanishes completely in the long run. However, the increasing proportion 
of illegal immigration after a reduction in the quota acts, in the long run, as an incentive 
to the underground economy. Accordingly, in order to meet their targets, politicians 
should take into account the short and long term effects of laying down a policy on the 
particular make-up of migration and on the hidden economy. 
  This study is structured as follows: the next section presents the model. Section 
3 determines migration in the short and long run; the size of the shadow economy; and 
wages. The consequences of migration quota policies on illegal immigration and the 
underground economy are developed in section 4. Lastly, in section 5, the main 
conclusions are shown, pointing the way to future research. 
 
2. The model 
  Individuals live for two periods. During the first one they work and during the 
second they consume the savings from the previous period. Before entering the labour 
market, they may decide to emigrate to a country with better living conditions. In this 
case, they adopt the behaviour of the native residents of the host country, and they 
themselves, and their descendants, are considered as natives in the period following. Let 
N be the size of the native population, m the migration rate (immigration in relation to 
the native population) and Q the legal immigration quota laid down by the government 
(permitted percentage of immigration in relation to the native population).  
3 Labour market. All the participants (both legal and illegal native residents and 
immigrants) provide a unit of labour in every period. 
A unique market exists where, apart from the legal economy, there is also an 
underground economy which uses illegal workers to produce goods and services which 
are fully equivalent to those produced by the legal economy. This underground 
economy survives thanks to the immigrants who arrive in the country with no 
documents and need the assistance of native workers who exploit illegal workers by 
appropriating a proportion of their wages. In Myers and Papageorgiou (2002), the “toll” 
plays a similar role in obtaining a residence permit.  
These enterprises are competitive and pay for this labour with a wage w which 
reflects their marginal productivity. The illegal immigrants receive a proportion θ <1 of 
this productivity, while the native residents who arrange their placement, share out the 
rest between them. The proportion of native residents who are in charge of the formal 
production, is φ <1 in each period. The remainder of the native residents (1- φ) engage 
the underground economy in which individual income is given by an equal share-out of 
the rents deducted from the illegal immigrants.  
The supply of native labour to the production system over the period t is 
therefore φNt. Thus, mtNt represents the immigration flow, of which QNt are legal and 
(mt-Q)Nt are illegal. So, the labour supply in each period is  
 L t =(mt+φ)Nt. (1) 
This labour supply grows during every period for two reasons: the fertility rate 
(n rate) and the immigration rate. As we consider immigrants as native residents in the 
following period, that is to say: 
  Lt+1 = (1+ mt)(1+ n)Lt (2) 
workers emigrate looking for better worker conditions, reflected by higher salaries (we 
assume perfect mobility of capital and thus there is no incentive to migration on the part 
of capital rents). The perspective of the host country is considered by assuming that this 
country is small, in the sense that its influence over the rest of the world is not 
significant. The salary in the country of origin is therefore given and lower than that of 
the host country: w0 < w. However, income in the host country is uncertain because 
immigration is limited to a set quota, which is a percentage Q of the native population. 
4 Once this quota has been met, immigration becomes illegal and wages for this group are 
reduced by the proportion appropriated by the native residents. When an immigrant 
takes the decision to emigrate, he or she does not know if he will be legal or illegal. 
Technology. A Cobb-Douglas labour-augmenting technology is considered: 
, in which A is a scale parameter and 
α α κ
− =
1 ) ( t t t t L AK Y κ  is an index of knowledge 
which, in the presence of spillovers at an aggregate level, could be considered as a 
function of capital (see, for example Romer, 1986 and Kemnitz, 2001). Making 
t t t t k L K = = / κ , where k denotes capital-labour ratio, and assuming a competitive labour 
market, the wage is arrived at from  
  ,   (3)  t t Ak w ) 1 ( α − =
The corresponding interest rate is constant and equal to  A r α = . If the rest of the world 
has access to the same technology, home and foreign interest rates coincide, and thus 
capital rents are not relevant in migration decisions. 
Preferences. Individuals share the aim of maximizing the utility function, 
subject to intertemporal restriction. Let   and  be the consumption of the first and 
second period of life respectively. The utility given is a log-linear form, with a 
subjective rate of intertemporal discount δ < 1. 
t c1 1 2 + t c
 U=ln +δln   (4)  t c1 1 2 + t c,
 
 
3. Short and long-term equilibrium 
  
  3.1 Short term equilibrium 
Migration.  As salaries are higher in the host country,  the legal immigration 
quota will be covered throughout the period. However, uncertainty over working 
conditions (either legal or illegal) in the emigration decision produces migration flows 
which exceed the legal quota. In contrast, expected income, although lower than in the 
formal market, is higher than wages in the home country. Given that the probability of a 
potential immigrant being hired legally is Q/m, equalling expected income in the host 











⎠  θw = w0. (5) 
From the relative wages in each period,  ˜  w  t = wt / w0, the above condition determines the 
migration rate as:  
  mt =
Q(1 −θ)
1−θ ˜  w  t
˜  w  t. (6) 
This migration rate increases with the wage differential reflecting a greater 
stimulus to migration. Given relative wages, the same applies to the legal immigration 
quota Q and the proportion of illegal workers’ salaries which the natives allow them to 
receive θ, since the higher these parameters, the higher the expected income in the host 
country (in the first case because this implies a greater probability of being hired 
legally, and in the second because penalisation suffered by illegal workers is lower). 
Underground economy. We have measured its size as the volume of work 
devoted to this type of economy
1. Free mobility between legal and illegal employment 
determines the decision of native workers regarding the employment they offer to the 
formal market and the work devoted to the underground economy, so that the marginal 
income will become equal in equilibrium (we assume no effort is devoted to prosecution 
of illegal activities and thus there is no risk involved in them). 
Total income from managing illegal immigration is given by the fraction (1-θ ) 
which is taken from the wages of the illegal workers (m-Q)N. These wages are shared 
out amongst native residents devoted to this activity, (1-φ)N. Therefore, equating 
income per unit of time in the legal and the underground economy implies: 
 
 
                                                 
1 The most usual measure of the scale of illegal employment is the amount of tax evasion (see, for 
example, Jung et al., 1999). We have not used this measure since we have not considered taxes in our 
simple model. In any case, apart from the amount of labour involved, two alternative measures of the size 
of the underground economy could be considered: i) the number of illegal workers, and ii) the production 
of this sector, which could be measured by the wages paid to illegal workers. For analytical convenience, 
we have chosen the labour force of residents devoted to this activity. This choice has no consequences, 
since, as it can be deduced from the analysis below, the three measures are proportional. This would also 
be the case for tax evasion, if the model had been extended to allow for taxes. 









(1 −θ)wt = wt, (7) 
from which it is deduced that the proportion of the underground economy is a growing 
function of the migration rate (the higher the migration rate, the higher the income 
produced in the underground economy), as in the expression:  
 ) )( 1 ( 1 Q mt − − = − θ φ . (8) 
Alternatively, substituting (6), a growing relationship with relative wages is obtained: 
  1−φ = Q(1−θ)
˜  w  t −1
1−θ˜  w  t
. (9) 
It is borne out that the quota, the proportion of wages received by illegal workers, and 
relative wages, all encourage the entry of illegal immigrants and therefore encourage 
native residents to manage this underground economy. 
Saving and investment. From the consumer side, represented by maximising 
utility in (4), subject to the corresponding budget restriction, it is deduced that 
individuals save a percentage δ/(1+ δ) of their income. Native income Nt  and legal 
immigrants’ wages mtNt coincide with that of the market. In the case of the illegal 
immigrants (mt-Q)Nt , income is a fraction θ of this salary. The aggregate saving at the 
time t is given by: 
  St =
δ
1+δ
(1 +Q) +θ(mt −Q) [ Ntwt ] . (10) 
Supposing that capital depreciates completely after its use in the production system, this 
saving is the capital available for the next period, Kt+1=St. Standardising these variables 
to fit the job supply, we obtain Kt+1 / Lt = kt+1(1 + mt)(1+ n)= St / Lt, where (2) has been 
used. Substituting the expression of saving (10), wages (3) and the expressions (6) and 
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. This equation indicates that the rise in the supply of capital 
from one period to another increases with the rate of saving δ/(1+ δ) andwith wages in 
the country of origin (w0), due to the fact that higher income in the country of origin is a 
7 disincentive to emigration, and therefore decreases the labour supply. Moreover it 
diminishes with the rate of fertility growth of the population, with the legal immigration  
quota (Q), and with the proportion (θ)  of the wage that illegal workers receive, since 
they imply a greater immigrant labour supply. 
 
3.2 Stationary state 
Stationary equilibrium is characterised by a stable value of capital per unit of effective 
employment, as well as production per capita and the immigration rate. From (11) the 
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which implies long term relative wages
2: 
 












This stationary equilibrium is stable and positive, provided that the parameters 
verify the restriction
3  .  1
                                                
) 1 )( 1 /( ) 1 (
2 − < < − + − B Q B B θ θ
Once the expression (13) has been deduced, we can confirm that a change in one 
of the parameters must occur, in order for relative wages to increase in the long term. If 
 
2 Condition  1 > B guarantees that both relative wages and income per capita in the stationary state are 
positive. Moreover, for relative wages to be higher than the unit, as we have supposed from the 
beginning, the legal immigration quota must verify the restriction  1 − < B Q . 
3The slope of the expression (11) indicates the way in which capital per unit of labour changes over time. 
In stationary equilibrium, this slope takes on the value 
) 1 (














t . Values of the 
quota which satisfy   imply that the slope is positive and less than the unit, which 
supposes that the stationary equilibrium is locally stable. In the opposite case the slope is negative in the 
stationary equilibrium. It can be confirmed that if the quota verifies 
) 1 /( ) 1 (
2 θ θ − − > B Q
  the slope is a module less than the unit, which 
maintains the result of local stability of the stationary equilibrium. Nevertheless, when 
) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 /( ) 1 (
2 2 θ θ θ θ − − < < − + − B Q B B
) 1 /( ) 1 ( θ θ − − < B Q , the slope is greater than one in module, and this gives rise to local instability. 
 
8 either the entry quota for legal immigration (Q) or the fraction of wages received by 
illegal workers (θ) drop, long run relative wages increase, due to the fact that the labour 
supply is lower, in response to a greater incentive for native workers to devote time to 
the underground economy. This is due, in the former, to a greater entry of illegal 
workers, and in the latter, to a greater appropriation of the rents of illegal immigrants. If, 
on the contrary, the rate of saving or vegetative growth increases, the long run relative 
wage decreases, due to lower capital-labour ratio. 
Taking the salary from (13) to (6), we obtain the expression of the immigration 
















The expression (14), in relation to (6), shows that the determining factors of the 
immigration rate in the short and long term are different. Only changes in productivity 
in the host country, its rate of vegetative growth, and its preferences (manifested in the 
rate of saving) affect the immigration rate in the long term. 
Finally, by substituting the previous expressions in (8) or (9), the size of the 
submerged economy in stationary equilibrium can be deduced. This is given by
4: 
  ) 1 )( 1 ( )* 1 ( Q B − − − = − θ φ . (15) 
Thus, low legal immigration quotas stimulate the underground economy by giving 
incentive to the illegal immigration from whose income the host country benefits. For 
this same reason, the underground economy is also larger, the larger the proportion of 
illegal workers’ income which natives can appropriate themselves. Finally, changes in 
the parameters which increase B have a similar effect, due to the fact that they increase 
the migratory flow, and therefore increase the scale of illegal immigration due to 
restrictions on the legal quota. 
 
4. Immigration policies and the underground economy 
  Governments in countries which are the destination of immigrants use 
immigration quotas as a preventive measure to avoid the excessive entry of foreign 
                                                 
4 La condition   guarantees that there is an internal solution in the percentage of 
native employment devoted to the underground economy.  
1 ) 1 ( 1
− − − − > θ B Q
9 workers. The above results show that matching this policy to the desired objective 
depends on the time horizon considered, since short-run and long-run effects appear to 
be different. Moreover, the choice of quota should take into considerations the possible 
effects on the underground economy. These effects also differ, depending on whether 
we adopt a short or long term perspective. 
  From our analysis it can be deduced that the policies which toughen ceilings on 
immigrants admitted to a country only have short-term effects on the migratory flows 
that the country receives. In the long term, a more restrictive ceiling only affects the 
actual make-up of migration, not its intensity. This is due to the fact that toughening the 
conditions for entry through cut-backs on legal quotas has two effects. Firstly, it is an 
immediate disincentive for immigration, by reducing the probability of finally working 
legally in the destination country. This reduces expected gains from emigrating. 
Secondly, as illegal immigration falls, the volume of saving increases, and this favours 
the accumulation of capital per worker which, in turn, increases salary levels. In the 
short term the first effect creates a cut-back in the migration rates which the later upturn 
in salary differentials finally offsets. At the end, the benefits from immigration have not 
changed but the migratory flow contains a much higher proportion of illegal workers. 
  It is true, however, that both native residents and immigrants who gain legal 
status enjoy a relatively better standard of living because they earn higher wages 
(compared with the rest of the world) – a conclusion also reached by Lundborg and 
Segerstrom (2002). Nevertheless, one must be cautious on this point, since other studies 
come to the opposite conclusion (for example, Berry and Soligo (1969), albeit within a 
static framework). 
  Besides changing the mechanisms which affect immigration, a policy of 
reducing quotas also has an effect on the scale of the underground economy. In the short 
term, the fall in migratory flow reduces the total income earned from the exploitation of 
illegal immigrants and, coupled with this, the activity of this sector. However, the 
progressive increase in wages and the recovery of the migratory flow with a higher 
percentage of illegal immigration offsets the initial effect and actually overshoots this 
level, so that restrictions on legal immigration in the end actually spur the underground 
economy. 
  As economic incentives have not disappeared, the legal restriction (on quotas) 
brings an increase in illegal employment as an undesirable consequence of this. This 
10 result suggests the need to propose policies to crack down on the underground 
economy, apart from other types of immigration policies. We have modelled this sector 
very simply, basically using the θ parameter which sums up the relation between 
employers who hire illegally and their workers. Governments’ attempts to eradicate 
illegal employment could then take the form of reducing employers’ ability to 
appropriate workers’ income (for instance by avoiding contracts with no social security, 
which result in a lower immediate cost for the contractor but also lower future benefits 
in the case of unemployment or retirement for the worker).  
  In accordance with the results in the previous section, clamping down on 
underground economy, which takes the form of reducing the ability to exploit illegal 
immigrants economically, brings an incentive to immigration in the short term, by 
increasing the expected income of immigrants in the host country. This effect is so 
significant that it actually increases the size of the underground economy: in spite of the 
fact that employers in the sector appropriate a smaller proportion of the income of 
illegal immigrants in this case, there are so many of these workers that the income 
obtained through this channel increases. Nevertheless, as in the case of quotas, the 
incentive to migratory flows disappears over the long term so that, at the end of the day, 
the size of the underground economy finally falls. Thus, an adequate combination of 
policies to control immigration and crack down on illegal employment will be 
successful in achieving these aims. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  We have developed a simple model that allows us to assess the relation between 
immigration policies in the form of quotas, the actual composition of immigration, and 
the size of the underground economy. We conclude that policies geared at cutting 
immigration quotas have the effect of reducing migratory flows only in the short run. 
This effect, however, vanishes completely over time.  
A tougher immigration policy has the desired effect of discouraging the 
underground economy in the short run. Again, however, the long-term effect is actually 
quite the opposite. In order, therefore, to discourage the development of the 
underground economy in the long run, the policy should be the contrary i.e. an increase 
in immigration quotas. 
11 Although we have considered a relatively simple framework, we consider that 
these results go some way to understanding the relationship between illegal immigration 
and the underground economy: very often actually the consequence of public policies. 
Of course, this analysis could be extended in several ways. Possibly the most interesting 
approach might be a public budget perspective which considers, on the one hand, the 
costs associated with setting migration quotas and, on the other, the effects of migration 
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